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In a press release dated 15 November 199l, Secretary of Agriculture Edward 
Madigan invited comments on the future of federal milk marketing orders. A number of 
specific questions were raised, beginning with perhaps the most fundamental of all: 
"Would producers, processors, and consumers be better served with less regulation or 
strengthened regulation under federal milk orders?" The questions are challenging. They 
are also subject to a certain amount of subjective assessment. Nevertheless, some of the 
basic questions can be approached objectively by economic analysis. In other words, 
economists may not be able to broadly and generally state that federal orders should be 
strengthened or weakened in one fashion or another, but it is possible to discuss the 
probable implications of certain changes and the historic rationale that led to the develop-
ment of federal order mechanisms and provisions. 
The questions posed by the Secretary can be summarized as follows: 
1. What are the implications of changing, or especially lowering, class I differentials. 
2. What are the implications of setting the class Ill price equal to the support price, or of 
making the basic formula price equal to the support price? 
3. In what ways do federal orders affect where a handler chooses to procure milk, e.g., 
in any given order area, what are the incentives for purchasing local milk vs. distant 
milk. Do orders cause purchasers to pay more for distant milk than would otherwise 
be necessary? To what extent do orders affect the allocation of milk between fluid 
and manufacturing uses. 
4. What might occur in dairy markets in the absence of federal orders? 
5. What alternative institutional arrangements or mechanisms might evolve in the 
absence of federal orders? For example, could some type of contracting mechanism 
between cooperatives and non-cooperative handlers replace some of the functions 
now performed by regulation. 
6. Does the experience with policies or market institutions of other countries shed light 
on the U.S. system or any of the various options for the U.S.? 
The remainder of the paper offers some answers and insights to these questions, based on 
an assessment of what prior research has shown or economic reasoning. 
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Class I Differentials 
Class I prices are the minimum prices regulated handlers must pay for milk used in 
class I. They are not paid directly to producers, as such, but clearly producers benefit in 
the form of minimum blend prices that increase as class I differentials and/or class I 
utilization (percentage of all milk used in class I) increases. In a sense, manufacturers of 
class II and class Ill products also benefit from the pooling of class I differentials; because 
they become able to offer their producers a higher, blended price while their direct cost of 
milk is the lower class price. 
In the November 1991 invitation, the question of whether lowering minimum class I 
differentials would be appropriate was advanced. It is clear from the testimony presented 
at the 1990 hearing that interested parties are widely divided with 1 ) a few voices calling 
for higher differentials, 2) many voices calling for maintaining the status quo, 3) an 
important contingent calling for a very substantial realignment that would involve higher 
differentials in areas where they are presently low and lower differentials elsewhere, and 
4) a few voices calling for eliminating differentials altogether. Although members of the 
committee individually differ in our assessment of what the optimal level of class I 
differentials is, we agree that insufficient consensus exists among researchers to unequiv-
ocally support one level or another. Given the level of concern about class I differentials, a 
thorough study, with broad participation by a cross-section of interested parties, might be 
very helpful and should be initiated with all due speed. Certainly, related studies have 
been done, but by the same token, a great deal of testimony at the 1990 hearing dealt 
with new ideas about which there was much debate. A hearing is not a forum for 
conducting new research. Work should be done to study the effects of various proposals; 
others can then judge their merits. 
The federal milk marketing order program has utilized classified pricing as the focal 
point of pricing milk to handlers and for producers since its beginning. In fact, coopera-
tives had some success in implementing classified pricing in many markets beginning 
decades before federal orders came into being. The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act 
of 1937 explicitly authorizes the practice, and U.S. Supreme Court decisions have affirmed 
the operation, of classified use price plans in fluid milk markets. Given a classified use 
price plan, by definition, there must be some type of a price difference or premium, termed 
a class I differential, for that portion of the milk supply utilized for fluid purposes. 
Two fundamental and inter-related questions about class I differentials are implied or 
stated in the call for public comments. First, what is the reason for having class I differen-
tials, i.e., what purposes do they serve?; and second, what is the appropriate level at 
which class I differentials should be established? 
While history is not always the best teacher, neither should it be ignored. In their 
1962 evaluation of the federal milk order program, the eighteen member committee 
chaired by E.G. Nourse offered the following rationale regarding the development of 
classified pricing mi.Qr. to the start of the federal order program: 
"In bargaining for prices for their members' milk, cooperatives immediately 
crashed head-on into the problem of the 'surplus' over fluid milk require-
ments.... Since milk qualified for distribution as fluid milk in any market must 
be available at all times in greater volume than what is actually sold as fluid 
milk in that market, the problem was one of so segregating such surplus or 
reserve that it would not cause serious instability in the level. .. of fluid milk 
prices. This problem was attacked, and to a greater or lesser degree met, by 
establishing one price for milk entering fluid use, and another price or prices for 
milk going to other uses." 
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The price stabilizing purpose of classified pricing including the class I differential is 
emphasized in the Nourse Report comments. This should not be interpreted as cyclical 
instability in the sense of what the dairy price support program has tried to correct; rather 
this refers to stability across seasons of the year and between different product and geo-
graphic markets. In addition, the class I differential serves two price incentive purposes. 
First, dairy farmers must receive a (blend) price higher than the reserve or manufac-
turing milk price to produce grade A milk because of higher costs of production incurred in 
producing grade A milk. This rationale derives directly from early difficulties with counter-
seasonal variations in milk production and fluid milk demand. A substantial percentage of 
producers who supplied fluid milk markets in the fall were summarily dropped in the 
spring; yet they had the higher costs of maintaining grade A status all year round. This is 
an aspect of what are today referred to as the balancing problem and the class I reserve 
requirement. The class I price is the primary source of such additional money. 
Second, there must be a price incentive 1) to move grade A milk from points of 
production to fluid milk processing plants, and 2) to "give up" milk at manufacturing plants 
and make it available to the fluid market. In the case of the former, it has generally been 
assumed that it would be rational to move milk the least distance necessary; hence federal 
orders have assumed a preference for "local" milk. However, fairness and economic logic 
dictates that local milk prices should not exceed the cost of available "distant" milk plus 
transportation to the "local" market. Particularly as pooling requirements became less 
strict over time, allowing more producers access to federal orders, the second purpose of 
freeing milk from manufacturers has become more important. Today, this is not always 
achieved effectively, and new ideas in terms of transportation pools, freight credits, 
location differentials, and balancing payments need to be carefully evaluated. 
It has been suggested by some that class I differentials contributed to the creation of 
milk surpluses in the 1980s. On a national basis, it is erroneous to conclude that existing 
class I differentials played a significant role for two reasons. First, the class I differential is 
fairly small portion of the average price received by dairy farmers. Second, for many years 
prior to 1986, the average class I differential was basically constant across all federal 
orders from one year to the next. 
In 1990, the average blend price established in federal order markets was $13. 78 per 
cwt. The approximate simple average of class I differentials in the federal order program is 
$2.40 per cwt. Given the fact that the Minnesota-Wisconsin price across the forty federal 
order markets explains 100 percent of the class Ill price, approximately 98 percent of the 
class II price, and approximately 84 percent of the class I price, average market utilization 
dictates that over 92 percent of the blend price generated in the federal milk order program 
each month are associated with the basic manufacturing price. Furthermore, for the 
period up to 1986, when class I differentials were constant, any statistical analysis of milk 
production would conclude that the increases in prices which prompted production growth 
were the result of increasing support prices and their effect on the M-W price, which drove 
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all class prices up equally. The average increase in class I differentials in 1986 was 38¢, 
which yields about 17¢ on the blend price to farmers; hence, though it was a positive 
factor, its stimulative effect on national milk production cannot be considered large. It is 
however true that there was substantial regional variation in the change in differentials. In 
some areas there was no change; in others the higher differentials added 60¢ or more to 
the blend price. After 1986, the increase in class I differential was a factor in some 
regions. We agree with the 1984 ERS-USDA report that noted u ••• the root cause of the 
grade A surplus is support prices that were set too high ... " (AGES840121, p. 48). 
Another criticism has been that class I differentials have created the situation where 
92 percent of the milk in the United States is now grade A while only 40 percent of the 
milk is utilized for fluid purposes. These selected facts are true, but pooling policies have 
had much more to do with this than the size of class I differentials per se. In their early 
years, federal orders covered only a small fraction of total milk production and class I 
utilization was high in every order. Many producers were attracted to the benefits of being 
associated with a fluid market, in fact this was the cause of tough competition and serious 
disputes between producers located very near large cities and producers located in rural 
areas more distant from the large fluid milk markets. As a result, strict pooling require-
ments were relaxed over time so that, generally speaking, as many producers can become 
affiliated with a federal order as want to. It is equally important to also recognize that 
many voices in the dairy production sector have been encouraging the switch to grade A 
production for general milk quality reasons that have little or nothing to do with price. 
Given current concerns for food safety issues, it would be rather strange to argue for 
lowering class I differentials in order to discourage the production of higher quality milk. 
Yet another criticism of the size of class I differentials has been associated with the 
reconstituted milk issue. As was suggested above, it may well be that other provisions of 
federal orders have been a larger issue here than class I differentials per se. Reconstituted 
milk has more to do with allocation and compensatory payment rules. Indeed, this is 
essentially the conclusion of the recommended decision on the 1990 hearing. This 
decision moves the pricing of reconstituted milk in the right direction. Assuming the 
recommended decision is adopted, the new allocation rules and the provisions for concen-
trated milks and nonfat dry milk may generate intermarket milk movements and put 
pressures on class I differentials that do not now exist. What will happen is hard to 
predict, but it would be prudent to wait and see before pre-judging a need for more radical 
change. There is no pressing need or reason at this point to tie the reconstituted milk 
issue to the issue of class I differentials. 
The federal milk marketing order program has brought a degree of order and stability 
to the fluid milk industry that was sorely needed in the past and is still desirable today. 
The program was established in an environment of market failure for hundreds of thou-
sands of milk producers and thousands of handlers. This failure may have contributed to 
the unnecessary demise of certain farms and firms, but the issue here is market failure, 
not the failure of a business. Market failure refers to the imbalance of market power 
which exists in the dairy industry and the inherent conditions for anti-competitive behavior. 
A half century plus later, we have a dairy industry that continues to be one of the most 
de-centralized of the leading agricultural enterprises in the United States. The rush to 
industrialize agriculture in the United States has been rapid, but family farms continue to 
be the virtually exclusive means for producing milk in the U.S. The federal order program, 
with its pooling arrangements that permit every grade A producer in a milkshed to share 
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equally in the class I differential and share equally in the responsibility for carrying reserve 
milk in the market, has been the key factor in providing this stability, and it has not 
seriously inhibited progressive performance in the milk producer sector. 
Deregulation, or more specifically lowering class I differentials, has little appeal when 
the motive is strictly deregulation for its own sake. Unregulated markets failed in the milk 
industry in the past, and conditions conducive to market failure still exist. The conse-
quences of deregulation in the airline, finance, and other industries indicate that too often 
the total set of consequences from a radical change cannot be identified or measured. 
It is just as unclear what the total effects of substantially lowering class I differentials 
would be. The one obvious effect is that minimum blend prices in federal order markets 
would drop, but only modestly as previously noted. Would cooperatives step into the 
breach, as some would contend? In some cases yes--in many cases no. Cooperatives 
have supported federal orders because they know that they face formidable powers when 
negotiating prices. Maintaining discipline in supply, holding on to members, is by no 
means assured. Without marketwide pooling, substantial inequities can occur between 
farms, or for that matter between cooperatives, pushing the milk producer sector in the 
direction of disorder and instability. 
The market bargaining power of cooperatives is discussed in a later section of this 
report, but let us make a couple of particular points here. A cooperative that runs a 50 
percent class I utilization is handicapped severely when one or more fluid processors in a 
market run 85 percent class I and procures milk independently. If dairy cooperatives did 
have sufficient market power to maintain or increase class I differentials, would they 
simply become the next point of attack for the deregulators? It is widely known that the 
Capper-Volstead Act is an antitrust exemption that has frustrated the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Justice Department over the years. In the somewhat less than likely 
situation where lower class I differentials were a factor in enhancing the strength of dairy 
cooperatives, would this simply fuel new assertions that cooperatives should not have the 
right to collectively bargain for milk prices or that they abuse the rights they have? 
Lowering class I differentials may change the effects of regulation, but it does not 
reduce the amount of regulatory activity. The pricing, verification, and equalization 
functions of the federal order program would continue at exactly the same degree of 
regulation. Impacts in the markets would be different for different people and would differ 
across markets. On balance, we would expect less price stability and more market 
disorder with lower class I differentials. Given that the move toward a more minimal price 
support program has already created more volatile markets, the milk producer sector would 
be stressed; without knowing what the appropriate change might be, this stress could well 
be unnecessary and counter-productive. Class I differentials need to be examined and 
changed, when and where appropriate. A start has been made with the different ideas 
that were advanced at the national hearing. Careful studies should be conducted to deter-
mine what changes should be made. 
Using the Support Price to Set Federal Order Class Prices 
The Secretary asked whether the lowest class price should be set equal to the 
support price (instead of the M-W price). Because the M-W price is the basic formula price 
" undergirding and moving all class prices, we would add to this question a closely related 
one: should federal orders use the support price as the basic formula price, affecting all 
class prices? Current federal order provisions state that the class 111 price shall equal the 
basic formula price, the class I price shall equal the basic formula price plus a constant 
differential, and the class II price shall equal the basic formula price with monthly adjust-
ments based primarily on the wholesale prices of basic manufactured dairy commodities 
(over time the adjustment on the class II price will be about 10¢). 
6 
One of the most important objectives of federal milk marketing orders is to create 
equity in the pricing of milk among producers and processors. In this case equity is taken 
to mean charging all processors reasonable and comparable prices for milk used to make 
the same or similar products and paying all producers reasonable and comparable prices, 
with appropriate adjustments for milkfat content and transportation. Without such equity, 
the clear potential exists for disorderliness and exploitation of some producers. These 
prospects are enhanced by the perishability of milk and the resulting necessity of an outlet. 
Setting the class Ill price to reflect the forces of supply and demand for milk used for 
manufacturing is critically important. 
As illustrated in Table 1, the M-W has seldom equaled the support price, and it has 
ranged from being almost 50% higher to being 5% below. In fact, in the last 37 years, it 
has been below support more than one out of every five months. 
Table 1. Relationships Between Monthly M-W and Support Prices for 3.5% Test Milk. 
M-W as a% 
Over Support 
(3.5% fat test) 
40.0% - 49.9% 
30.0% - 39.9% 
20.0% - 29.9% 
10.0% - 19.9% 
5.0% - 9.9% 
1.0% - 4.9% 
.1% - .9% 
.1% 
0.0% 
-.1% 
-.1 % - -.9% 
-1.0% - -4.9% 
-5.2% 
Months from 
1955to1991 
# % 
7 1.6 
6 1.4 
12 2.7 
38 8.6 
93 20.9 
165 37.2 
18 4.1 
4 .9 
3 .7 
1 .2 
13 2.9 
83 18.7 
1 .2 
Months from 
1980 to 1991 
# % 
3 2.1 
4 2.8 
10 6.9 
9 6.3 
9 6.3 
29 20.1 
2 1.4 
3 2.1 
2 1.4 
1 .7 
5 3.5 
66 45.8 
1 .7 
Many things could be said about Table 1 . Some important insights can be learned 
from focusing just on the period since January 1980. 
The last time period when the M-W price was 1 % or more below the support price 
was the first half of 1986. In addition, prior to then, no month before that ranks higher 
than 3.3% over the support price. This was November 1984, which gained a high price 
due to the effects of the Milk Diversion Program. 
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In sharp contrast, the first time that the M-W price ranked 5% or more above the 
support price was three months in winter, 1986-1987, which were 5.0 to 5.8% above the 
support price due to the effects of the Dairy Termination Program. Since then, almost all 
of the months above 5% came during the peaks of 1988 (6 months), 1989 (9 months), 
1990 (10 months), and 1991 (7 months). The time periods when the M-W was 20% or 
more above the support price were September 1989 to September 1990 and September 
1991 to December 1991. 
In other words, when the support price was set at levels that pushed market prices 
up and resulted in large surpluses, the M-W ran at or below the support price. Since the 
support price has been reduced, the M-W has frequently run well above the support price. 
There is nothing mysterious about this result; however it does strongly suggest that a 
policy of minimal price supports coupled with a federal order provision to set the class Ill 
price or the basic formula price equal to the support price would result in substantially 
lower minimum federal order blend prices and, given the limited bargaining power of 
farmers, probably substantially lower average farm prices actually received. 
The foregoing also illustrates the importance of distinguishing between using the 
support price to set the class Ill price vs. using it to set the basic formula price. If the 
basic formula price is made equal to the support price, at least all class prices will be held 
in the same relationship. If only the class Ill price is set equal to the support price, while 
class I and II prices are set relative to the M-W or some similar price mover, then there 
would likely be substantial and wild distortions between the minimum prices handlers 
would have to pay for the different classes of milk. This would create another whole set 
of problems. 
One counter argument is that cooperatives and other handlers would have the 
opportunity to pay higher prices if market conditions warranted. While this is true in 
theory, in practice it is a long leap to assume that the kind of monthly price movements 
which have taken place historically could have just as easily occurred through frequent 
competitive price negotiations. A major presumption of federal orders is that handlers 
have the market power to bargain prices down to a lower common denominator but will 
acquiesce to higher prices if they are in line with supply and demand and all handlers are 
treated relatively equally. If USDA ties federal order prices to the support price, it runs the 
risk of 1 ) occasionally setting a minimum price that is considerably higher than market 
conditions warrant and 2) frequently setting a price that guarantees farmers will get a 
lower price than that which they would obtain in a market which is regulated so as to 
neutralize the bargaining advantage of milk handlers. It should also be noted that federal 
order minimum prices help processors in their negotiations with their customers, most of 
whom have considerable bargaining advantages themselves. Retail and whqlesale buyers 
of dairy products know about federal order prices. They are much more willing to accept 
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increases in the wholesale prices they pay to processors for dairy products when minimum 
prices rise than they are when processors tell them that farm prices are up due to 
competitive premiums. Obviously, if a processor has a hard time passing along a higher 
farm price, he will not be able to pay farmers as much, even if he is otherwise willing to 
do so. 
A basic formula or class Ill price that is below the market price would create the 
potential for market disorderliness and exploitation because: 
• Producers of the same product (3.5% butterfat milk) could be paid substantially 
different prices, creating the opportunity for processors to choose to pay those 
individual producers in the most favored market position higher prices. The 
difference between the true market price and the support price would provide 
the margin for such differential pricing. The differentials in prices may mean 
the difference between profit and loss. It creates the potential for disruptive 
competition for market outlets. 
• The opportunity for exploitation is created in those markets where a single 
processor dominates the market. While in competitive markets, premiums over 
federal order class Ill prices set at the support level may be paid, there is no 
assurance that such premiums will be paid. 
Historically, substantial controversy has arisen over USDA policies which set 
different class Ill prices regionally. This is the case because the class Ill product markets 
(primarily butter, nonfat dry milk and cheese) are national in scope. This reality is reflected 
in the uniform CCC purchase price for these products. Setting different class Ill prices 
regionally or in different markets became an item of intense controversy in the 1960s, 
after which a standard class Ill (and class II) price was adopted. When lower prices are 
charged regionally for class Ill milk, plants in those regions have the potential for receiving 
a windfall profit compared to other plants. 
This is precisely the contemporary argument regarding the pricing of milk in Califor-
nia, where the lowest price class is set on the basis of a wholesale product price formula. 
The California formula uses a make allowance that is lower than that utilized by USDA 
under the dairy price support program. The result is an advantage to those plants who buy 
milk from producers when the California price is below the class Ill price elsewhere and sell 
products to the CCC for the same price anyone else gets. In addition, profits made on 
class Ill products reduce processor incentives to supply higher priced class I and class II 
markets. A similar argument has recently surfaced in response to the Department's 
recommended decision regarding a class Illa price for three federal milk marketing orders in 
the Northwest and Northeast. 
An answer to these issues that is frequently used asserts that federal milk orders 
were established for the purpose of only setting minimum prices. For example, in the 
past, the USDA has refused to raise the class I differentials despite an acknowledged 
increase in transportation costs, the theory being that the competitive market would 
provide the incentives for attracting class I milk to distant markets through over-order 
premiums. Such a theory applied to class Ill would make milk pricing largely a function of 
the relative bargaining position of producers and processors, which is highly uneven across 
the United States. In other words, it is not necessary for the government to set prices for 
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purposes such as causing milk to move from one market to another--a primary function of 
over-order premiums. Likewise, premiums may be paid on class Ill milk for differences in 
product quality (protein, bacteria count, etc.). However, price differences unrelated to 
such functional purposes create the potential for serious inequities. 
These types of inequities provide strong economic justifications for a policy of setting 
a class Ill price that: 
• Is uniform throughout the federal order system. 
• Reasonably reflects market conditions, such as the prices received for the prod-
ucts made from class Ill milk. 
Neither of these criteria are satisfied by a more abstract price support target that, in any 
given month may deviate substantially from a market value. 
Setting a low price support is the current government policy. Even if the price 
support is raised, seasonally high market prices would create similar inequities and a 
potential for exploitation, and further aggravate the problems of securing milk for class I 
and class II needs during the fall months. 
Milk Procurement Incentives Under Federal Orders 
The Secretary posed a specific question which can be paraphrased as follows: 
Assuming policy-makers wish to impose less regulations, should they remove pricing 
regulations that cause purchasers to pay more under the order for milk brought into a 
market than would otherwise be necessary to attract milk to that market? A narrow 
interpretation of this question would focus on the issue of pricing reconstituted milk. As 
has been stated earlier, we believe the USDA decision with respect to pricing reconstituted 
milk is essentially sound and well grounded. At least in terms of setting a logical principle 
for pricing, we believe the decision puts this specific issue to rest. 
A broader interpretation of this question suggests several related questions or issues. 
Well accepted bases for class I differentials were discussed earlier, i.e. to provide appropri-
ate incentives for 1 ), producing grade A milk and 2), shipping milk to fluid plants. Many 
years ago, when the class I price was 40% or more above the lowest use class price, 
adequate incentives were provided for both purposes. As more and more milk has been 
pooled on federal order markets, class I and class Ill prices have moved closer together. 
Today, there are adequate incentives for producers to maintain or convert to grade A 
status, although it bears noting that the incentive has not been and is not so great that 
everyone has converted. In addition, because of marketwide pooling and a higher class Ill 
price, the difference between class Ill and class I prices is not so high as to ensure that 
each class I handler can always get milk at the minimum class I price. Hence, it cannot be 
said that current class I differentials guarantee a supply to fluid markets. Nor is the 
answer to raise class I differentials to generate 1950s type price relationships. Rather, 
more subtle provisions of federal orders can affect incentives to transport milk. 
A guiding rationale in establishing class I prices and other provisions related to 
serving class I markets has been as follows. It has been taken for granted that class I 
.. 
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handlers would underpay for milk if left to their own devices; hence some sort of reason-
able minimum price was deemed desirable. Yet, what constitutes a reasonable minimum? 
The logic has been that it is rational to move milk no farther than is necessary given the 
volumes of milk demanded and produced in given locations. Thus, local milk is preferable 
to distant milk, other things being equal. Following this logic, the price of local milk should 
not be less than the price of the next cheapest source of milk, plus the cost of moving the 
milk from that distant location. To set a minimum price for local milk any lower than that 
defeats the purpose of obtaining the best possible price for farmers; to set it any higher 
forces handlers to pay an unreasonable price from the buyer's perspective. 
In fact, USDA's actual decisions have been to price local milk at slightly less than the 
cost of distant milk plus transportation. In this way they hoped to err on the side of not 
setting the minimum price higher than necessary. In practice, the system evolved to 
assume that the relevant distant supply was located in the Upper Midwest region, such 
that all federal order prices east of the Rocky Mountains increase with distance from the 
Upper Midwest. The so-called "transportation differential" component is more approxi-
mate that it is deliberate, but it has been a basic guiding principle. This particular imple-
mentation has come under sharp attack by Midwesterners who argue that the single base-
point concept is no longer valid. Whether it is or not does not invalidate the notion of 
some kind of base point pricing, wherein local milk is preferred to distant milk, so long as 
the distant milk is not cheaper when both are valued as delivered to the receiving plant. 
Federal orders want to prevent handlers from getting cheaper milk if the reason for that 
lower price is an unfair bargaining edge; they don't want to prevent handlers from getting 
milk that is cheaper on the basis of justifiable production and marketing costs. 
The logic of this rationale is fine, but in recent years things have happened that lead 
many industry participants to wonder if specific order provisions need to be updated to 
carry out this logic. In their 1990 leaflet, Hammond and Harris provide a review of 
existing and alternative federal order provisions related to the orderly movement of milk to 
fluid markets. 1 Additional studies could be done to delve more deeply into how a specific 
alternative might work or how it might best be structured or implemented. 
Implications of Eliminating Federal Orders 
In his request for comments, the Secretary explicitly referred to terminating federal 
orders. The impacts on producers, processors and consumers of eliminating the entire 
federal order system are by no means obvious or clear; yet there are lessons to be learned 
from the period before marketing orders and when individual orders have been terminated. 
Prior to federal orders, the market environment was characterized by a major 
variation in seasonal milk production, unequal market power between producers (and even 
1 Jerome Hammond and Hal Harris, "Alternative Order Provisions to Facilitate the 
Orderly Movement of Milk to Fluid Markets," Leaflet 22, Dairy Policy Issues and Ootions, 
Dept. of Agr. Econ., Cornell University, 1990. 
~ . 
their dairy cooperatives) and the buyers of milk for fluid purposes, major milk price wars 
and disorderly marketing. Under these market conditions: 
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• Producers experienced inequities in prices paid between those who had access 
to fluid markets and those who did not, this includes producers who had only 
seasonal access to fluid markets as well as those who never had such access, 
• Processors paid different prices for milk resulting in persistent downward pres-
sure on milk prices, and 
• Consumers faced extreme volatility in prices with reduced assurance of supply 
and quality. 
Federal order legislation was enacted to alleviate this market disorder. Legislation 
was strongly supported by producers, processors and even consumers. The appropriate 
question is, have market conditions since changed where federal orders are no longer 
needed to assure orderly marketing and a supply of wholesome milk at reasonable prices? 
There is limited experience where an existing federal order has been eliminated. 
Dobson and Salathe studied the elimination of the Chicago and the Mississippi federal milk 
orders.2 The Chicago order was voted out by producers during May 1966-June 1968. 
During this period conditions remained relatively stable because many former Chicago 
order plants pooled under the Milwaukee order, and a very strong group of dairy coopera-
tives operated a "quasi-order" which performed many classified pricing, pooling and 
auditing functions previously carried out under the federal order. Even so, conditions 
deteriorated over time and these same dairy cooperatives found it preferable to create a 
new Chicago Regional federal order, encompassing the former order and existing neighbor-
ing orders. 
Conditions were less stable when the Mississippi order was voted out by producers 
for the period May 1973-March 1976. In the absence of the order, "flat" pricing replaced 
classified pricing. Sharp variations in prices paid to producers by individual handlers 
developed as fluid milk sales shifted from handler to handler within the market, milk 
producers shifted from handler to handler, and milk that would otherwise be used for 
manufacturing purposes was brought in from outside of Mississippi at lower prices to 
displace the class I sales of local producers. 
From this limited experience, it appears that classified pricing and pooling provisions 
are useful, if not necessary, for elimination of the type of market disorder that developed 
in Mississippi. To the extent that dairy cooperatives can control the grade A milk supply 
and engage in successful bargaining, they may be able to preserve classified pricing and 
pooling mechanisms similar to those under federal orders. However, questions exist 
regarding the ability of cooperatives to maintain these conditions over extended periods. 
Prior to federal orders, dairy cooperatives were not overly successful in implementing and 
maintaining classified pricing and pooling. Have conditions since changed? 
2Dobson, W.D., and Salathe, LE., "The Effects of Federal Milk Orders on the Economic 
Performance of U.S. Milk Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 61, 
No. 2, May 1979, pp 213-227. 
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Milk production has certainly become less seasonal in recent years. Yet seasonal 
variations in demand for both fluid milk and manufacturing dairy products still create 
surplus conditions in the spring, with milk prices falling dramatically toward support levels, 
and deficit conditions in the fall, with prices rising to much above support. The current 
low support level permits, and thereby reveals, this underlying instability in dairy markets. 
Fluid milk processors are fewer in number and relatively large in size and market fluid 
milk products in relatively large geographic areas. In 1960, there were 2,259 handlers 
regulated under federal orders, with a ratio of 84 producers per handler. Even with a 
larger share of the national market, in 1990, there are only 753 regulated handlers, with a 
ratio of 133 producers per handler. Thus, buyers have become more concentrated relative 
to sellers. 
Dairy cooperatives have also become fewer in number, larger in size and market a 
larger share of producer milk today than prior to federal orders. About 390 dairy coopera-
tives market about 76 percent of all producer milk. About 200 cooperatives market more 
than 80 percent of the milk regulated under federal orders. While a number of larger, 
regional dairy cooperatives exist, their ability to organize marketing agencies-in-common 
for a given federal order and regional milk bargaining agencies for the purpose of negotiat-
ing over-order premiums is spotty. These premiums, where they exist, are largely 
undergirded and enabled by the fact that the federal order system provides a structure and 
base upon which to build. Without orders, the cooperative premium system would 
weaken. 
Thus, despite this structural change in dairy cooperatives, it is highly questionable 
whether cooperatives would be able to maintain effective classified pricing and pooling 
arrangements. Classified pricing rather than complete flat pricing would likely still exist 
but not to the extent that currently prevails. There are costs to transferring grade A milk 
from manufacturing areas to fluid markets. Although minimal, production costs are higher 
for grade A than manufacturing milk. The price elasticities of demand between fluid milk 
products and manufacturing products differ, allowing for price discrimination. However, 
the differences in elasticities have narrowed considerably, lessening the ability to place 
higher values on grade A milk for fluid versus manufacturing uses for purely price discrimi-
nation purposes. 3 Other rationale for a difference between the price of class I milk and 
class Ill milk are not affected by this change in elasticities, in particular the location value 
of milk. 
Without federal orders, fluid milk prices would likely become much more variable and 
market "disorder," similar to what emerged in the Mississippi when the order was voted 
out, might surface. Dairy cooperatives, by themselves or through the formation of 
marketing agencies-in-common, would face two major problems in price negotiations with 
fluid milk processors. First, handlers with a larger proportion of their milk used for fluid 
milk sales than the market average may be in a position to stay outside of the bargaining 
agreement. They could pay producers who are not members of the cooperative the same 
or even a higher price for grade A milk while actually incurring a lower cost for class I milk 
needs. Cooperatives would find it difficult to maintain higher prices for grade A sales to 
3Haidacher, R.C., Blaylock, J.R. and Lester, H.M., report in "Consumer Demand for 
Dairy Products," USDA-ERS, Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 537, March 1988, p 7, 
price elasticities of -0.26 for fluid milk, -0.33 for cheese, and -0.17 for butter. 
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their fluid milk handler customers. These customers would find themselves at a competi-
tive disadvantage in competing with the handler outside of the bargaining agreement for 
fluid sales in the same market. This type of bargaining problem currently exists even with 
federal orders in place. Unless most producers join a cooperative for the purpose of 
marketing their milk and bargaining for a price, this situation would not improve in the 
absence of federal orders and could, in fact, intensify. 
The second problem stems from the problem of procuring for fluid purposes lower 
cost grade A milk from outside the market, that might otherwise have been used for lower 
value manufacturing purposes. Establishing a fair value for local milk versus distant milk 
was an item of contention in the 1990 hearing. Regardless of the outcome of these 
deliberations, an order system provides protection against continued deterioration of milk 
prices, which would probably result if federal orders were eliminated. 
In the absence of federal orders, some states would no doubt attempt to establish 
state orders. The effectiveness of state orders in milk pricing is severely limited by their 
legal ability to restrict or price milk and milk products entering from other states. Lack of 
uniform state regulations and pricing provisions would add to disorderly marketing. One of 
the appealing reasons for federal orders was to eliminate the confusion of multiple and 
different forms of state regulation. 
Assuming dairy cooperatives or other bargaining organizations were able to maintain 
effective classified pricing and pooling arrangements, federal orders without pricing provi-
sions would still provide a valuable service to the industry. Market administrators collect 
marketing data from regulated handlers who account for almost 80 percent of the grade A 
milk marketings and about 71 percent of total milk marketings in the country. From these 
reports, data are compiled and totaled for each market and for all markets under the 
program. Reported data are audited to ensure accuracy and proper payment. In a sense, 
audits are the primary tool for enforcing adherence to the rules of the order. A very 
valuable side-benefit of these statistics is that they provide reliable information that is 
helpful in current buying and selling, in future planning, and to basic research undertakings 
by universities, the government and others. The statistical information collected under 
federal orders is probably the most comprehensive body of marketing information available 
on any agricultural commodity. 
Impact on Producers 
The impact of unregulated markets on producers would vary by region. In regions 
having a relatively small share of milk supply utilized for fluid purposes, primarily the Upper 
Midwest, producers may experience less reduction in income than producers in regions 
where fluid sales are a much larger share of total milk supply, such as the South and 
Northeast. Nonetheless, all producers regardless of region stand to lose substantially with 
no federal orders. 
Producers would experience more variable fluid milk prices. In the absence of 
marketwide pooling, some producers may actually experience higher prices. This may 
occur if a fluid handler procures directly from a select group of producers the quantity of 
grade A milk required for its fluid needs, operates that fluid plant at capacity but provides 
no balancing functions or other marketwide services. Any milk in excess of fluid needs 
would be the responsibility of someone else. In this situation, those producers not 
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associated with this fluid handler are likely to receive lower prices because of a larger 
share of milk being utilized for manufacturing purposes and the costs being born for 
marketwide balancing functions. If milk supplies become burdensome at times for a given 
market, some independent producers could actually lose their market access. With federal 
orders having marketwide pooling, there is not the incentive on the part of handlers to 
restrict milk intake. Producers are more assured of a market for their grade A milk. 
Highly variable milk prices are more than just a simple nuisance for producers. The 
uncertainty created in this sort of market means there are greater price and income risks 
faced by producers. These risks are a cost of production which in effect means that 
producers, in total, will not be as willing to produce the same amount of milk for a given 
price. Economists say that the supply curve shifts to the left when risks increase, i.e. it 
will take a higher· price to get the same amount of milk. Dahlgran estimated that a small 
risk shift would more than offset the price benefit of deregulation presumed to exist for 
consumers when risk is ignored;4 
lmoact on Processors 
As previously mentioned, handlers are most fearfuf of unequal milk costs among 
competitors. Without established minimum federal order prices for fluid milk and regula-
tions on the procurement of cheaper source milk from outside a given market, competing 
handlers would likely face unequal milk costs. Even if cooperatives negotiate with all 
handlers in a market for the same fluid milk price, there are economic advantages for some 
handlers to remain outside the negotiations and make special deals with producers who are 
not cooperative members. In most markets, there are sufficient quantities of grade A milk 
not under the control of the cooperatives to erode or partially erode their bargaining 
efforts. Generally, it is believed tl")at cooperatives cannot gain control of price negotiations 
unless they control 90% or more of the milk supply. 
Impact on Consumers 
Consumers would also experience more variable fluid milk product prices. In markets 
having high class I prices now, consumers may experience lower fluid milk prices. To the 
extent reconstituted milk is utilized, some consumers could see relatively substantial drops 
in fluid milk product prices. However, with these potentially lower milk prices comes a 
potential problem. The assurance of an adequate supply of fluid milk products in the 
stores daily on a year-round basis may be lessened without federal orders in the case of 
some primarily fluid markets. As was common prior to federal orders, handlers may 
engage in milk price wars. Milk price wars could force some handlers out of a market and 
eventually lessen competition. In this situation, it may even be possible that for some 
markets consumers would actually end up paying more for fluid milk over the long run. 
More variable, and potentially lower producer milk·prices in some regions, would 
reduce total milk supplies. Manufacturing milk and milk product prices, as a result, would 
increase. In the absence of federal orders consumers would pay more for manufactured 
milk products. 
4 Roger A. Dahlgran, "Welfare Costs and Interregional Income Transfers Due to 
Regulation of Dairy Markets," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 62, no. 2, 
May 1990, pp. 288-296. 
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Alternative Mechanisms to Replace Federal Orders 
The Secretary posed the question: "Could contractual arrangements between 
cooperatives and handlers replace some of the functions now performed by the federal 
order system?" Of course, in theory the answer is yes. In practice, the answer is more 
like maybe and several possibilities exist. More generally, the question refers to the 
potential for alternative new or existing institutions, private or public, that might take the 
place of federal orders and their functions in the event orders were terminated or their 
authority pared back. 
The functions of the order system, according to USDA, are "to assist farmers in 
developing steady, dependable markets by providing prices for their milk which are reason-
able in relation to economic conditions" and "to assure consumers of adequate supplies of 
pure and wholesome (fluid) milk at reasonable prices." The basic tools that orders use to 
achieve these objectives are classified pricing (minimum prices based on use) and pooling 
(rules for dividing the proceeds equitably among dairy farmers). To facilitate the specific 
and most desirable appti,cation of pricing and pooling, orders also rely on ancillary rules and 
regulations that specify who, how, and under what circumstances producers and milk 
buyers pay certain prices and/or participate in the pool of revenues generated. Orders also 
audit buyers to assure that the milk is paid for properly. 
Federal orders do not absolutely dictate prices for buyers or sellers. It is not impossi-
ble for producers to receive less than the federal order minimum blend price for milk, and 
they certainly can receive more. Likewise, processors, may have to pay more than the 
appropriate class price for milk, and occasionally they will be able to buy some milk for 
less. Nevertheless, the practical outcome of federal minimum pricing is that all producers 
have a reasonable sense that they are being paid equitably and similarly for their milk, and 
all processors can be reasonably assured that their competitors are paying comparable 
prices for milk; this minimizes many incentives for market disrupting behavior. Given the 
primary importance of the pricing and pooling functions of marketing orders, the discussion 
below focuses on alternative mechanisms for pricing milk between and across buyers and 
sellers. 
Contractual Arrangements With Cooperatives 
Contractual arrangements with cooperatives, the alternative specifically mentioned 
by the Secretary, might take over some of the pricing functions and, perhaps, the pooling 
functions of a marketing order. About 75 percent of milk under federal orders today is 
sold through cooperatives to plants and dealers under formal or informal contractual 
arrangements. Needless to say, however, the price and quantity basis underlying these 
contracts are the classified prices and verified sales by class announced in the various 
orders. Whether such contracts would gain in use under discontinued or modified orders is 
conjectural. Given the declining influence of cooperatives in many orders in recent years, 
and the possibility of greater defections in an unregulated or less regulated market, 
reasons exist to doubt this possibility. 
Without question, cooperatives would attempt to perform the pricing and at least 
some of the pooling function that orders now fulfill. In the event pricing was dropped, 
individual cooperatives and, more particularly, cooperative federations would attempt to 
play the pricing and/or pooling role by means of contract. Without the auditing and 
.. 
16 
information-providing functions provided by orders, chances for long term success are 
poor. If orders continue to provide these functions, the possibility is improved that such 
cooperative contracting would succeed with little market disruption or price erosion. Even 
greater odds of success would result if orders, in the absence of minimum price regulation, 
were given the task of approving contracts, reporting contract terms, and enforcing 
contracts between cooperatives and processors. This is not unlike the marketing agree-
ment option that existed prior to federal orders and which is still available today. This 
option proved unsatisfactory when it was first tried. 
If some overt assistance to cooperatives such as the alternative above is not given, 
and particularly if auditing and information functions are dropped, the prospects for long 
term success of such a strategy is poor. Experiences in Chicago, Mississippi, and most 
recently in the Carolinas, all showed a gradual deterioration of cooperative coordination, 
which resulted in efforts to reestablish or promulgate an order. 
Cooperatives, or cooperative federations, would have to represent virtually all of the 
producers in an area to have much chance of success. As in the past, there would be 
incentives without orders for processors to pick up non-member suppliers in the fall and to 
cut off some of these suppliers during the spring flush season. Because the opportunity 
cost of this "homeless" milk is nearly zero, producers who lost their market would sell at 
extremely low prices, thus ~roding the ability of cooperative to effectively price milk. 
Another Contractual Alternative 
In the absence of orders or under orders with a diminished role, another form of 
contracting is a likely successor to current institutions. Processors will contract directly 
with producers. The exact form of such contracts is hard to predict, and we have 
different opinions as to how far it might go. It could be that buyers would contract with 
producers without changing substantially the role of the producer as an independent 
business. It is possible that these contracts could evolve into a system that more closely 
resembles arrangements that have existed in the poultry industry for decades, and which 
are rapidly transforming the pork industry. For example, as in the case of poultry and 
hogs, the integrator may own the cows and supply the feed, with the farmer supplying 
facilities and labor. By means of such contracts, processors, and perhaps some feed 
manufacturers, could internalize the open market instability that is likely to appear. Large 
producers located in close proximity to processors may benefit. 
Regardless of changes in these market mechanisms, rapid changes in industry 
structure, even compared to trends in recent years, will occur. There will be far fewer 
farms and fewer plants. The dairy industry that emerges will perhaps be technically more 
efficient than is the current structure, but market signals in the form of openly quoted 
prices, etc. will eventually be difficult to find. Cooperatives may continue to play a role 
under such a structure, but a diminished one. Major companies may effectively control the 
industry. Dairy farmers may lose management control, but many might prosper economi-
cally as sellers of their labor, and for the use of assets in the form of production facilities. 
Whether this sort of structure, particularly at the more extreme end, is desirable, 
depends on the eye of the beholder. It boils down to a question of philosophy, and 
perhaps politics, as much as economics. 
.. 
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Futures Market--Another Private Possibility 
A futures market is really only a standardized system of forward contracts. There is 
a possibility of the development of a futures market for American cheese and perhaps 
powder, irrespective of the future of federal orders. The price volatility that has existed 
for the past few years may create the opportunity for such a mechanism that the industry 
can use as a hedging tool. Price fluctuations also attract the speculators needed to ensure 
adequate volume for a viable futures market. 
Futures contracts are contracts for a delivery of a specified volume of a standardized 
commodity at some future date. A futures contract could provide opportunities for 
hedging by taking a futures market position as a temporary substitute for a position in the 
cash market for the commodity: For example, a cheese manufacturer, anticipating the sale 
of cheese in six months, could sell (short) futures contracts for delivery over the same 
time period at some specified price. Six months later if the cheese price is below the price 
locked in earlier, the manufacturer could deliver the contract. However, the manufacturer 
would likely sell the cheese at a lower price and offset the futures contract sale with an 
offsetting purchase contract. Adding the profit from the futures market transaction to the 
lower cash market price would yield about the same price that was locked in the original 
contract. 
A futures market could be effective in protecting a manufacturer's inventory 
positions and/or his forward sales of dairy products. Product users could benefit by fixing 
ingredient costs. Producers would be able to benefit because their cooperative or plants 
they deal with could lock in a price for cheese, and forward contract for milk at a price 
consistent with the futures price. 
Some other·agricultural industries with active futures markets (cotton, corn, wheat, 
soybeans, feeder cattle) have retained an open market, dispersed, production sector. In 
other cases (hogs, fed cattle) the existence of an active futures market has not prevented 
dramatic structural change. Government programs affecting cotton, grains and oilseeds 
have had more impact on industry structure than the futures markets. Futures markets 
have some potential for the U.S. dairy industry, regardless of the ultimate fate of federal 
milk orders. They offer some intermediate term price protection, but in no way can they 
take over the functions of orders. Farmers themselves would be unlikely to use futures 
directly. Moreover, any connection between fluid milk prices anc,t hard product prices 
under this arrangement is speculative at best and very tenuous in the short run. 
Quasi-Public Institutions 
Another possibility for assuming the functions played by the order system is to turn 
over these functions to an industry operated, but closely government supervised agency to 
price producer milk and set the rules for other important terms of trade. A marketing 
board or an exclusive bargaining agency could fill this role. Both would require new federal 
legislation. Both would imply a major departure from what is basically an open market, 
free enterprise system. Both amount to a government sanctioned monopoly operating 
under tight public restrictions. Both would probably result in assured healthy producer 
incomes, stable prices, and a continuation of a relatively dispersed system of family farms 
for the intermediate future. Congress and USDA have shown little interest in granting 
producers this much authority, although there has been some interest in the concepts in 
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·.:. the U.S. in the fairly recent past and other countries have employed similar institutions. 
(For a detailed description of how these institutions would operate, refer to "Who Will 
Market Your Milk," Texas A & M University, 0-1058, 1978.) 
Public Alternatives 
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The fact that government institutions are dismantled or stripped of some of their 
influence does not necessarily ensure that those functions will pass to the private sector 
forever. Witness the hue and cry to re-regulate some industries that have been freed of 
government influence in recent years. Rest assured that in the absence of orders or under 
orders with little power, conditions of disorderly marketing will arise. 
This disorder is probably required to force institutional adaptation to the changed 
regulatory environment. The first step, however, when such conditions arise will be 
powerful pressure on Congress to raise the support price, as an alternative to order 
pricing. Whether such an attempt would be successful is unknown, but lobbying efforts 
would probably dwarf the massive attempt to raise prices in 1991 . 
There would also be efforts to reinvigorate state milk control, as still practiced by 
California and parts of several other states. During the milk price crisis last year emergen-
cy legislation in several states helped prop up the industry, and other states have begun to 
explore this option. 
One of the problems with state regulation, which led to federal orders replacing most 
such agencies in the past, was the inability of states to effectively regulate interstate dairy 
trade. As more milk and dairy products moved in interstate commerce, this constraint 
proved often to be fatal. It will likely do so again and create a lot of turmoil in the mean-
time. 
If disruptive marketing conditions arise, affected parties, who in the past gave legal 
challenge to state orders, might view such problems as less serious than an unregulated 
industry. Or states might form multi-state compacts--legal under the constitution--to get 
around this constraint. An effort was made in recent years to create such a dairy compact 
in the Northeast. While such state mechanism could theoretically achieve the same ends 
as federal orders, it is doubtful that they would be achieved as efficiently if applied on a 
wide scale. 
Summary of Alternative Mechanisms 
Nobody knows what type of institutional structure would spring up if federal milk 
orders were eliminated or imposed less regulation. The alternatives discussed above 
probably do not constitute a complete listing. The institutional environment might change 
quickly, but it would more likely evolve gradually. It is possible that institutional change 
might eventually mean increased government involvement instead of less. The industry 
and institutional structure that ultimately emerges may not be greatly different from the 
current one in terms of technical and economic efficiency, even if it is radically different. 
Finally, the costs of transition to a new institutional environment cannot be ignored. 
.. 
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Lessons From Other Countries 
Two questions were posed by the Secretary. What institutions have other countries 
used in milk marketing that shed light on our own system? Are there particular aspects of 
milk marketing that are carried out more equitably or efficiently in other countries than in 
the United States? In general, it can be observed that most countries which have a 
prominent dairy sector have found it desirable to create government policies to support 
and regulate it. However, we know more about how these policies relate to our price 
support program and its objectives than we do about regulations directed more toward 
fluid milk markets. In fact, few countries have beverage milk markets that compare to the 
U.S. A recent book by Wyn Grant provides a survey of what is known about the policies 
and politics of the dairy sectors in North America, Europe, and New Zealand. 5 
In most countries, dairy industries are important for economic, sociological and 
political reasons. As a result, virtually all foreign dairy industries receive some degree of 
national sponsorship. Generally speaking, other dairy industries are managed for domestic 
goals such as income maintenance, food security and rural economic development 
purposes. To achieve these societal goals, domestic dairy prices are generally higher than 
those that would otherwise occur or those that occur in international trade. 
To accomplish their domestic policy goals, nations institute various forms of border 
protection. Popular border protection measures include variable levies or tariffs, import 
quotas and/or various licensing and phytosanitary regulations. If domestic price levels are 
high enough to create surplus milk production, domestic dairy policies generate burden-
some milk surpluses. Generally, excess surplus problems are handled through subsidized 
export sales in world markets and/or the imposition of supply management or supply 
control procedures within respective dairy countries. 
Consequently, world dairy trade comprises only approximately 5 percent of world 
production. World dairy trade prices reflect the mix of policies implemented to deal with 
domestic dairy industries and the surpluses generated by those policies. Current world 
prices do not reflect what prices would be in the absence of national support of domestic 
dairy industries. One must also be careful to distinguish between the average prices of 
products sold between countries and the average prices for dairy products or farm milk 
including domestic prices. The latter is higher and both are subject to distortions. 
Most of the analyses of world dairy policies concentrate on the aspects of those 
policies that produce manufactured dairy products which are used for world trade. 
Available information as to how individual countries operate their domestic fluid milk 
marketing programs is limited. This, of course, is especially relevant because the federal 
order program is first and foremost a fluid milk program. The following general observa-
tions can be made. 
Domestic fluid milk markets generally sell either fresh fluid milk, UHT (ultra high 
temperature pasteurized) milk and/or milk reconstituted from whole milk powder. General-
ly speaking, fresh fluid milk markets, because of their perishability, are more expensive to 
operate and the most complex fluid milk marketing systems. In 1991, it was estimated 
5 Wyn Grant, The Dairy lndustry--An International Comparison, Aldershot, England, 
Dartmouth Publishing Co., Ltd., 1991. 
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that only about 35 percent of world dairy production was consumed as fluid products. 6 In 
the United States, approximately 39 percent of our production is consumed in fluid form, 
almost entirely as a beverage. This compares to about 28 percent in the EC; 35 percent in 
Canada, 63 percent in Japan, 6S percent in China, and 93 percent in India. In quite a few 
of these countries, a major use, even a majority use, of fluid milk is as a lightener for tea. 
New Zealand consumes only about 5 percent of its annual production as fluid product. 
In nearly all cases, fluid milk used in domestic consumption is priced higher than 
comparable milk used for the manufacturing of dairy products. Prices generally are 
specified by formulas, usually economic formulas, or provisions for classified pricing 
schemes. For example, the United States generally runs a three-class fluid milk pricing 
system (California uses a five-class system). In Ontario, milk is classified into 10 classes 
and sub-classes of milk product utilization. The U.S. develo.ped a fresh fluid milk market 
and the federal order system very early. As a result, most other milk markets used 
classified pricing after having studied and copied parts of the U.S. federal order program. 
Most fluid milk market industries in domestic countries have location specific regula-
tion. In Canada, fluid milk markets are regulated by each province. Likewise, in Australia 
individual states establish fresh milk quota, and there is little interstate fresh milk trade. 
The United Kingdom has five national/regional milk marketing boards linked by a federa-
tion. Distinct milk marketing regions specified by either political boundaries or milk 
marketing patterns are common in world domestic fluid milk systems. 
Fluid milk receipts are pooled on a marketwide basis throughout virtually all of the 
federal order system and some state orders, in the U.K., and in most provinces of Canada. 
Under two very small federal orders and a couple of small state orders, milk is pooled on 
an individual plant basis. The other common way to distribute Class I receipts is to 
allocate them to holders of fluid milk supply contracts or quotas. Under many of these 
plans, elaborate rules have developed to allocate fluid milk quotas in ways deemed socially 
desirable. An example in the U.S. is the class I base plan, which was used for a time in a 
few federal orders and is used under state orders in California and parts of Virginia. 
While U.S. federal order prices are directly linked to the manufactured milk market 
through the Minnesota-Wisconsin price, the linking of domestic fluid milk markets to their 
manufactured milk markets varies across countries. Some countries use economic price 
formulas or cost of production formulas to set fluid milk prices, as is done in California and 
a few other less significant states. Others prescribe fluid milk prices by component values 
generated from their manufacturing milk markets. These patterns are influenced by 
whether the fluid milk market is fresh, UHT or reconstituted. 
There is a lack of generalized information about the operation of fluid milk markets in 
other countries. In general, in all countries with fresh milk market industries prices vary by 
location and region. Generally, domestic fluid milk prices will be higher and different from 
those for manufacturing milk in the same country and location. The domestic fluid milk 
markets and manufacturing milk markets are linked in each country by the supply of milk 
6Carley, Dale H. "Overview of World Dairy Programs, Policies, and Situation," mimeo 
Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Georgia, College of Agriculture and 
Environmental Services, Georgia Experiment Station, Griffin, GA 30223-1797, February 
1992. 
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available to both fluid milk and manufacturing milk processors within a given country. 
Linkages of the two sectors generally come through supply pressures and not necessarily 
through price linkage. There is a great variety in the use of differential pricing, economic 
formula pricing, product price formula pricing, and fluid milk quota allocation schemes in 
many countries ~round the world. 
Summary 
In this paper, we have used objective economic rationale and our knowledge of the 
dairy industry and dairy policy to address questions about the federal milk marketing order 
program. It is obvious that many questions have arisen in the last few years. Available 
information and studies provide some answers and insights. 
Determining the optimal level of class I differentials is certainly the most contentious 
issue. History and economic logic indicate that a sound basis exists for some difference 
between the values of milk used in manufacturing and milk used for fluid purposes, 
whether or not this is formalized in a system of classified pricing. The primary purpose of 
federal orders is to ameliorate the market failures and instabilities that result from the lack 
of market bargaining power among producers. Classified pricing is a tool to achieve this 
purpose. Its purpose is not to create regional price differences per se; yet the fact that it 
is a part of regional price differences cannot be denied. Methods of addressing fundamen-
tal problems of market failure in the dairy industry merit serious study. 
The notion of giving government a less intrusive role and assuming that cooperatives 
can bargain effectively for producer prices has some popular appeal, but we are skeptical. 
Despite the fact that many years have passed since orders were first authorized, and many 
structural and technological changes have occurred, the ~conomic conditions that gave 
rise to federal orders still exist. No doubt, various alternative institutions and mechanisms 
would evolve if federal orders were eliminated or seriously weakened, but the hardship on 
U.S. dairy farmers would be serious and widespread. The disorder that would result would 
prove difficult for processors as well. We doubt that there would be any net benefit to 
society from this disruption, short term or long term. 
Of course, none of us would argue that current provisions of federal orders could not 
be improved. Moreover, each of us have different ideas about what would constitute an 
improvement. Policy-makers and interested parties must work to establish a clear set of 
goals and constraints for federal orders. Economic analysis can shed light on the extent of 
certain problems, their nature and cause, and the likely outcomes of corrective measures. 
Economic sciences can not establish social priorities. Given a set of objectives, econo-
mists can apply their knowledge and skills to determine efficient methods for achieving 
these goals. 
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